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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks have gained remarkable appreciation over the last few years. Despite 
significant advantages and tremendous applications, WSN is vulnerable to variety of attacks. Due to 
resource constraint nature of WSN, applicability of traditional security solutions is debatable. Although 
cryptography, authentication and confidentiality measures help in preventing specific types of attacks but 
they cannot safeguard against node misbehavior attacks and come at significant cost. To address this 
problem, we propose a Trust Based Secure Routing Protocol (TBSRP) which relies on distributed trust 
model for the detection and isolation of misbehaving nodes. The TBSRP aims to establish shortest path 
that contain all trusted nodes, identify packet forwarding misbehavior caused by malicious and faulty nodes 
and reroute the traffic to other reliable paths. The performance of TBSRP is evaluated in terms of packet 
delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay and normalized routing load. Simulations results show that 
TBSRP can achieve both high delivery ratio and throughput in presence of various numbers of 
misbehaving and faulty nodes. 
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1.  Introduction 
The interest of research community has significantly increased in sensor networks 
during last few years due to low-cost solutions for diversity of applications including 
environmental monitoring, vehicle tracking and detection, healthcare, traffic control in smart 
roads, battle field monitoring, surveillance and battle damage assessment [1]–[3]. Most of the 
times WSN operates in un-attended environments which exposes the deployed sensor nodes to 
variety of security attacks [4],[5]. The security attacks in WSN may be classified into two types: 
Outsider (External) attacks and Insider or node misbehavior attacks [6]. In outsider attack, 
attacker lacks authentication and key information and such type of attack can easily be dealt 
with classical security mechanism such as cryptography, encryption and authentication. In 
insider attack, an adversary already has all key and cryptographic information so that it can 
easily change the behavior of a node. Therefore, such type of node misbehavior attacks cannot 
be dealt with traditional security measures. The most common insider attacks are wormhole, 
blackhole, selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks [7]–[9]. Several secure solutions have been 
develop [10]–[12] to protect WSN against variety of attacks. However, these solutions exploit 
traditional security mechanisms such as cryptography and authentication which are mostly not 
suitable to counter nodes’ misbehavior attacks as these techniques assume that participating 
nodes as cooperative and trustworthy. However, this assumption is not realistic for insider or 
node misbehavior attacks [13]. Similarly, these traditional security measures require some sort 
of central administration for security management which is usually not available in self-
organized ad-hoc and sensor networks [14]. The efficacy of cryptography based solutions is 
ineffective in a case where an authorized compromised sensor node due to internal attack, can 
have easy access to memory contents and valid secret keys [15]. In addition, these traditional 
security solutions require high computation, memory and energy consumption which restrict 
their implementation in resource constrained sensor nodes [16]. 
To overcome limitations of traditional security primitives, the concept of trust has been 
successfully applied to ad-hoc and sensor networks to counter node misbehavior attacks. Trust 
TELKOMNIKA  ISSN: 1693-6930  
 
Countering Node Misbehavior Attacks Using Trust Based Secure Routing .... (Adnan Ahmed) 
261
management is an effective tool that is suitable for security architecture of sensor network 
[17],[18]. Several trust aware routing schemes have been developed over the years. In [19] a 
geographical trust aware routing protocol for combating blackhole and grayhole attacks in 
sensor network is proposed, which however generate huge amount of traffic over network by 
sending periodic updates for collecting firsthand (direct) and secondhand (indirect) information. 
Moreover, if the node mobility is very high it may increase trust build-up mechanism time. To 
defend against wormhole attack in WSN, a trust-aware routing framework (TARF) has been 
proposed [20]. Each node to keeps record for trust and energy cost values for their known 
neighbors. Trust evaluation is based on detecting routing loops, whereas nodes involved in 
routing loops are penalized. Energy control messages are broadcasted that contains energy 
cost information to deliver a packet. However, broadcasting of energy control packets may 
increase routing load and it may also suffers from selfishness attack where a compromised 
node may send false energy cost information. A trusted node may be declared as malicious 
node if it drops packets due to significant level of congestion. In [21] trust based routing protocol 
based on AODV (TAODV) is proposed for MANET which exploits trust information in route 
discovery. The proposed scheme is not feasible for resource constrained environment such as 
WSN as it is computationally intensive and makes use of cryptographic module for providing 
security. Furthermore, authors did not consider the effects of attacks on their proposed scheme. 
A trust aware routing protocol (TARP) has been proposed for sensor actuator network [22]. The 
parameters like echo ratio and link quality have been used for evaluating the trustworthiness. 
The echo ratio represents broadcast overhearing messages in promiscuous mode. TARP 
makes use of various broadcast and unicast messages for maintaining and updating link quality, 
communication state and echo ratio. However, the type of node misbehavior attacks and its 
effect on trust model is neither mentioned nor considered. The link quality parameter for 
evaluating trust is not an appropriate choice as link quality may degrades due to inference or 
noise which effects in the decision making capability of trust model. Furthermore, efficacy of 
proposed scheme is only measured in term of energy consumption which is not the relevant 
parameter for evaluating the efficacy of trust based scheme. In [23], a trust based routing 
scheme, Friendship based AODV (Fr-AODV), is presented to counter blackhole attack. Trust 
evaluation is based on certain features such as node reputation and node identity. Each feature 
is assigned attribute number that is exchanged during packet forwarding. However, the 
proposed solution is not completely robust against node misbehavior attacks. The authenticated 
compromised node may exchange false information such as feature attribute number which 
may lead to incorrect decision making by trust model. Moreover, Fr-AODV is vulnerable to 
wormhole attack where a malicious node impersonates its identity. The increased number of 
route maintenance calls and exchange of hello messages also increases load on trusted nodes. 
In this paper, we propose a light weight and quickly deployable Trust Based Secure 
Routing Protocol (TBSRP) for WSN to detect and isolate misbehaving and faulty nodes. TBSRP 
employ distributed trust model for dynamic identification of malicious and faulty nodes and 
thereby isolates them at earliest. TBSRP can re-route the packets to alternate routes if active 
paths encounter faulty or misbehaving nodes. The node’s trust level and hop count are used for 
selecting reliable and shortest route. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides proposed TBSRP scheme. Section 3 presents the research methods. Section 4 
presents the simulation results and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  TBSRP- Proposed Scheme 
The routing in WSN is modeled as directed graph ܩ ൌ ሺܸ, ܧ,ܹሻ where ܸ represents set 
of sensor node in network, ܧ represents the set of links between the nodes and ܹ represents 
the metrics used for measuring links. A trusted path ܲ consist of set of trusted sensor nodes 
݅, ݆, ݇, … , ݊ ∈ ܸ and ሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܧ. For each ܰሺ݅, ݆ሻ ∈ ܧ, it is assumed that node ݅ is the sender node 
and node ݆ is the receiver node. It is assumed that a faulty node ݇ may drop packets randomly 
due to significant congestion and its behavior is modeled as shows in Eq.(1), while the malicious 
node always drops all the received packets.  
 
ܨሺ݇ሻ ൌ ൜1				݇	݂݋ݎݓܽݎ݀ݏ	ݐ݄݁	݌ܽܿ݇݁ݐݏ0								݇	݀ݎ݋݌ݏ	ݐ݄݁	݌ܽܿ݇݁ݐݏ                                                                           (1) 
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The proposed trust base routing scheme, TBSRP, extends routing mechanism of AODV 
protocol. The Trust Evaluator, Trust database, Route Resolve and Route Setup constitutes the 
four building blocks of proposed TBSRP scheme. The Trust Evaluator evaluates the 
trustworthiness of nodes. The trust database stores all necessary information required in trust 
establishment such as Node ID, packet forwarding ratio, direct and indirect trust values. The 
route setup is responsible for finding routes that contains all trusted nodes. If at some later time 
some malicious, faulty or energy deficient node becomes part of active route, route resolve 
process is initiated to inform source node to establish new trusted path. 
 
2.1.  Trust Evaluator 
The trust evaluator evaluates the trustworthiness of neighbor nodes by overhearing 
their transmission in monitoring mode [24] and dynamically indentifies misbehaving nodes. The 
results obtained from monitoring packet forwarding behavior of nodes are stored in Trust 
database. Based on the packet forwarding behavior of node ݆, node ݅ evalutes trust for node ݆ 
represented by ௜ܶ,௝ as in equation (2).  
 
௜ܶ,௝ ൌ 	ݓଵ 	ൈ	 ௜ܶ,௝ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ ൅	ݓଶ ൈ ௜ܶ,௝௞ ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ                                                                (2) 
 
௜ܶ,௝ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ denotes the degree of direct trust node ݅ has for node ݆, based on the node ݅’s 
observation of packet forwarding behavior for node ݆. ௜ܶ,௝௞ ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ represents the average 
degree of indirect trust node ݅ has gained using recommendations from its neighbors (݇) for 
node ݆.	The weight factors ݓଵ	 and ݓଶ are assigned to ௜ܶ,௝ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ and ௝ܶ,௞ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ respectively, 
such that ݓଵ ൅ ݓଶ ൌ 1,	whereas	0 ൑ ݓଵ ൑ 1	and	0 ൑ ݓଶ ൑ 1.  
The direct trust, ௜ܶ,௝ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ in equation (2), represents fundamental entity in constituting 
trust model and it is evaluated by monitoring the behavior of neighbor nodes. In order to 
estimate the direct trust, we compute packet forwarding ratio of a node. The packet forwarding 
ratio is the measure of number of correctly forwarded packets to the number of packets 
supposed to be forwarded, as shown in equation (3). 
 
௜ܶ,௝ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ ൌ ∑ ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀݁݀
ேିଵ௣ୀ଴ 	ሺ݌ሻ ∑ ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀	ሺ݌ሻேିଵ௣ୀ଴൘                                                 (3) 
 
Every time a node receives a packet from neighboring node ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀	ሺ݌ሻ incremented 
by 1. Similarly, every time the node successfully forwards the received packets to intended 
destination ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀݁݀ሺ݌ሻ is incremented by 1. 
An indirect trust in evaluated from the observations gained through interactions with 
neighbors who notify about their own direct observation for particular node. The indirect trust 
	 ௜ܶ,௝ሺݐሻ is evaluated as: 
 
௜ܶ,௝௞ ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ ൌ 	 ଵ௡	∑ 	 ௞ܶ,௝	௡௞ୀଵ   (4) 
 
௞ܶ,௝	 represents the degree of indirect trust evaluated by node ݇ (common neighbor of 
node ݅ and node ݆). The evaluated indirect trust is exchanged as a part of recommendation with 
node ݅. ௞ܶ,௝ is the average of existing trust evaluated by neighbors of node ݅ (node ݇) for node ݆. 
Trust estimation involving indirect trust degree speeds-up the convergence of trust evaluating 
process. Based on packet forwarding ratio, trust model at node ݅ expresses the behavior of 
neighbor ݆ as either: well-behave or malicious-behave. If the packet forwarding ratio of node is 
above specified threshold ߛ, the node is considered as well-behave (trusted) node, otherwise it 
is considered as malicious node.  
Figure 1 shows the analysis and efficacy of trust estimation mechanism of trust model. 
The weight factor plays an important role in trust estimation so we assigned higher weight to 
direct trust (ݓଵ ൌ 0.6	) than indirect trust (ݓଶ ൌ 0.4) because it corresponds to direct 
observations gained by a node with its own interactions which are more accurate and timely 
available. It is observed that trust degree for well behave nodes increase linearly with time. 
Similarly, trust degree values for misbehaving nodes decreases as the simulation proceeds. It is 
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due to fact that trust rating for well behaving nodes incremented each time as it cooperates in 
packet forwarding. On contrary, negative assessment for misbehaving nodes is increment as 
they drop the packets. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Average trust for misbehaving and trusted nodes 
 
 
The design of our trust model does not make use of cryptography, thereby requiring 
least computations. In addition, our trust model avoids the use of resource intensive parameters 
for trust estimation such as security attributes, link quality and routing loop. Therefore, it offers 
light weight secure solution which neither imposes too many constraints nor requires any 
specialized set of resources. These features together with dynamic detection of misbehaving 
nodes makes our trust model an appropriate choice for resource constrained WSN as compared 
to existing schemes. 
 
 
2.2.  Route Setup 
The Route Setup is responsible for establishing shortest and trusted route. The 
proposed scheme expands the route setup process of AODV in order to select reliable and 
efficient path that contains all reliable and trusted nodes. The distinguishing characteristics that 
leads to the selection of AODV protocol are: it is on-demand protocol means it enables to find 
routes when it is desired and reduces control packet overhead, provides fresh/latest routes 
information, capable of both broadcast and unicast routing, low connection setup time, more 
scalable and reduced storage cost. TBSRP make use of composite routing metric, where an 
equal and adaptive weights ߙ ൌ 0.5 and ߚ ൌ 0.5 are assigned to node’s trust level and hop 
count respectively which selects trusted and shortest paths for routing. High delivery ratio is 
achieved when reliable nodes are selected for delivery packets to destination. Consider a 
network shown in Figure 2(a) which assumes node ܽ as the sender and node ݀ as the receiver. 
Node ܽ wishes to transmit data packets to node ݀, it broadcasts RREQ packet to its neighbors 
to initiate route discovery process. The neighboring nodes forwards RREQ packet to their 
neighbor nodes and also make reverse route entry for node ܽ, same process continues till route 
request packet reaches to destination. Destination (node ݀) unicasts RREP packet to node ܽ 
along the reverse route. If multiple RREQ packets have been received by destination from 
source via different routes, it sends multiple RREP packets along reverse routes to source 
node. This assists node ܽ to make decision accordingly and appropriate path among available 
paths is selected comprising of only trusted nodes. When a RREP packet is received by an 
intermediate node ݄ from its downstream neighbor ݅, which is not a destination node, node ݄ 
refers to the trust table to check the trust value of node ݅. If node ݅ is trusted one, it is included in 
the route, send RREP message to its upstream node(node ܽ)and makes forward route entry for 
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node ݀. RREP packet is dropped by node ݄ if it find node ݅ as unreliable node, and same 
process remains continue until route reply packet reaches at source node. Source node takes 
the routing path a-b-c-d as it is shortest path (contains all trusted nodes) and free of malicious 
nodes. The Figure 3 shows the flow chart for the route discovery of proposed TBSRP scheme. 
 
 
  
(a)                      (b)  
 
Figure 2.  Route Discovery and Route maintenance process 
 
 
2.3.  Route Resolve 
The responsibility of Route Resolve procedure is to send RouteError control packet to 
source node so that new route may be established when the condition ݂ݎ௜,௝ ൏ 	ߛ	becomes true 
meaning that an active route encounters some malicious or faulty nodes whose packet 
forwarding ratio is less than specified threshold value. In proposed scheme, route maintenance 
process is carried out whenever an intermediate node finds packet forwarding misbehavior 
caused by malicious or faulty nodes. A Route Error (RERR) message has been generated and 
forwarded to source node to find alternate route. Source node, reporting node and all 
intermediate nodes marks that route as an invalid route and source node starts new route 
discovery process. Consider the example shown in figure 2(b), where node ݄ finds the condition  
݂ݎ௜,௝ 	൏ 	ߛ  has become true for node ݅, it consider the node ݅ as misbehaving node and forwards 
RERR message to source node(node ܽ) for finding a new reliable route.  
 
 
3.  Research Method 
In this study, NS-2 simulator [25] has been used to analyze the performance of 
proposed TBSRP scheme. We consider blackhole attack for simulating misbehaving nodes 
where compromised nodes send fake route discovery packets to attract most of traffic. The 
behavior of faulty nodes is also simulated as some of the nodes drop packets randomly due to 
network faults or significant congestion level. Our simulation model is based on a network of 50 
sensor nodes deployed randomly within an area of 1000m x 800m. The numbers of malicious 
and faulty nodes are varied from 0 to 5. In all experiments, the packet forwarding threshold (ߛሻ is 
set to 0.6 while the trust threshold (ܶݎݑݏݐ௧௛௥௘௦௛ሻ	is set to 0.8. All nodes are initialized with neutral 
trust value 0.5. We used IEEE 802.15.4 as the MAC layer protocol. Constant Bit Rate (CBR) 
traffic has been used for the flows with packet size equal to 1500 bytes while the simulation time 
is 1000 seconds. The performance TBSRP and AODV is analyzed in terms of packet delivery 
ratio, average end-to-end delay and normalized routing load. 
 
 
4.  Results and Discussion 
Figure 4 shows the performance of TBSRP and AODV in terms of packet delivery ratio 
(PDR) against number of malicious and faulty nodes. It is evident from the results that both 
AODV and TBSRP shows increased PDR when there no malicious and faulty nodes in network. 
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The difference becomes prominent when at maximum number of malicious and faulty nodes as 
shown in Figure 4(a) and (b). The PDR for AODV decreases significantly by almost 90% as 
most of the traffic is attracted towards malicious nodes, as shown in Figure 4(a). By applying 
TBSRP, delivery ratio increases significantly as proposed scheme help the nodes to find trusted 
routes and isolate malicious nodes at earliest. Similarly, Figure 4(b) shows that TBSRP 
significantly improves the PDR when few faulty nodes drop random number of packets due 
congestion in active routes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. TBSRP Route Discovery Flow chart 
 
 
Figure 5 show the comparative results of average end-to-end delay for AODV and 
TBSRP under malicious and faulty nodes. When there are no misbehaving nodes in network, 
delay is similar for AODV and TBSRP. As the number of faulty and malicious nodes increases in 
the network, it creates more route disconnections which results in increased delay performance 
as shown in Figure 5(a) and (b). TBSRP relies on trusted and shortest routes avoiding 
misbehaving and faulty nodes therefore it shows better performance in term as average delay 
as compared to AODV where least number of packets delivered to destination in presence of 
increased number of malicious and faulty nodes. 
The normalized routing load is an impotant design factor that should be considered 
while designing a routing protocols for WSN. As WSN is resource constrained network, 
increased routing load may badly effects the network lifetime of WSN. Figure 6(a) and (b) 
demonstrate the higher network overloads for AODV than TBSRP as it requires more number of 
retransmissions due to presence of malicious and faulty nodes in active routes. The more 
number of cotrol packets for route discvoeries further contributes to increased routing load of 
AODV. On contrary, the route remains more stable in TBSRP due to comprising of trusted 
nodes, therefore require less number of retranmissions and route discoveries.  
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(a)                                             (b)  
 
Figure 4.  PDR performance with malicious and faulty nodes 
 
 
To sum-up, the proposed TBSRP offers a multifacet routing strategy thereby minimizing 
the overall routing and network overheads for resource constrained sensor nodes. Table 1 
presents the comparative analysis of proposed and existing schemes. TBSRP and TARF make 
use of composite routing metric which can adapt to dynamic nature of network. The proposed 
scheme incurs low routing and network loads as compared to existing schemes due to simple 
and robust design without involving too many broadcasts and exchange of control packets. 
Furthermore, proposed scheme can also detect faulty nodes responsible for dropping packets 
due to significnalt level of congestion.  
 
 
 
 
(a)                                               (b) 
 
Figure 5.  End-to-End delay performance with malicious and faulty nodes 
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(a)                                                     (b)  
Figure 6.  NRL performance with malicious and faulty nodes 
 
 
Table 1. Comparative Analysis 
 TBSRP TARF TARP AODV 
Routing metric Composite Composite Singular Singular 
Routing overhead Low High High High 
Network Load Low Medium High High 
Fault Detection Yes No No No 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight and readily deployable Trust Based Secure 
Routing Protocol (TBSRP) for wireless sensor network to isolate malicious and faulty nodes. 
TBSRP can also re-route the packets to other routes if established route encounter packet 
forwarding misbehavior due to faulty or congested nodes. The simulation results prove the 
efficacy of proposed scheme. The performance of TBSRP is compared against AODV in terms 
of packet delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay and normalized routing load. The simulation 
results show that malicious nodes badly affect the overall performance of AODV and bring down 
the PDR and throughput to unacceptable ranges. TBSRP significantly improves the overall 
network performance and isolates malicious and faulty nodes at earliest. As part of future work, 
we plan to compare the performance of proposed scheme against other node misbehavior 
attacks such as wormhole and Sybil attacks 
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